Politics or management? Analysing differences in local implementation performance of the EU Ambient Air Quality directive. by Bondarouk, E. et al.
Journal of Public Policy (2019), page 1 of 24
doi:10.1017/S0143814X19000035
ART ICLE
Politics or management? Analysing differences
in local implementation performance of the EU
Ambient Air Quality directive
Elena Bondarouk1*, Duncan Liefferink2 and Ellen Mastenbroek3
1Leiden University, Institute of Public Administration, The Netherlands, 2Radboud University, Institute
for Management Research, Political Sciences of the Environment, The Netherlands and 3Radboud
University, Institute for Management Research, Public Administration and Political Science, The
Netherlands
*Corresponding author. E-mail: e.v.bondarouk@fgga.leidenuniv.nl
(Received 29 September 2017; revised 7 January 2019; accepted 14 January 2019)
Abstract
As far as local governments are responsible for the practical implementation of many
European Union (EU) policies, they codetermine member states’ EU compliance records
and the fate of EU legislation. Yet, they do so in remarkably different ways, as exemplified
by the variegated implementation of the Ambient Air Quality Directive 2008/50/EC by
Dutch municipalities. Taking guidance from the literature on EU compliance, in this
article we explain the differences in local implementation performance based on the
political and managerial approaches. Understanding which of the two approaches drives
different local responses to EU policy bears consequences for the appropriate remedy for
nonimplementation. Four municipalities were purposefully selected along with the two-
by-two implementation performance scoring matrix in the realm of air quality. A
comparative within-case analysis specifies how political explanations outweigh manage-
rial explanations in accounting for variation in implementation performance and distils
‘policy saliency’ as the driving causal mechanism.
Key words: air quality; comparative within-case analysis; EU directive; implementation; local
government
Introduction
Local governments are responsible for the practical implementation of many
European Union (EU) policies. The Urban Waste Water Treatment Directive (91/
271/EEC), the Environmental Noise Directive (2002/49/EC) and the Ambient Air
Quality Directive (2008/50/EC) are just a few examples of EU policies affecting
local governance. While the European Commission initiates this legislation, it has
little enforcement capacity on its own and has to rely on the member states and
their constitutive levels of government to ensure that this legislation is put into
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practice. This begs a classic question regarding to what extent Brussel’s expecta-
tions are dashed locally (cf Pressman and Wildavsky, 1984). Yet, the EU com-
pliance literature has paid little systematic attention to the local implementation of
EU policies (Treib, 2014; Versluis, 2007). This lack of systematic attention is
surprising as analysis of local implementation is instrumental to understanding
how member states make EU policies work (Thomann and Sager, 2017).
Recent studies on the local implementation of the EU Ambient Air Quality
Directive 2008/50/EC (AAQ) in the Netherlands revealed that there is great var-
iation in policy responses at the local level (Bondarouk and Liefferink, 2017; but
also see a description of German local implementation variation - Gollata and
Newig, 2017). Besides setting minimum procedural obligations, like drawing up a
management plan, monitoring air pollution and informing the public on the state
of pollution, the directive leaves it up to the implementers how to go about it
(Bondarouk and Liefferink, 2017; Gollata and Newig, 2017). While faced with the
same regulatory pressure, some Dutch municipalities took more extensive mea-
sures than others (Bondarouk and Liefferink, 2017). Accordingly, a pattern of local
pioneers and laggards – those who do more and those who do less – emerges (Lee
and Koski, 2012; Liefferink et al., 2009; Liefferink and Wurzel, 2016; Urpelainen,
2009). The local differences in air quality policy efforts are even more surprising
considering that the Dutch national government reserved 372 million euros for
local air quality measures. All municipalities were invited to stake a claim to these
subsidies. In light of the same regulatory pressure and available financial resources,
the question arises – how can these differences in local implementation of EU AAQ
policy be explained?
EU compliance research has shown that national differences in compliance at
the transposition level – the level where EU legislation is transposed into national
law – can be largely explained by domestic politics (Mastenbroek and Kaeding,
2006; Treib, 2014). Whether this politicisation of EU policies can also account for
differences in local implementation is yet to be determined (Treib, 2014). Alter-
natively, the management approach in EU compliance research views imple-
mentation as a matter of managerial capacity and the way policy implementation is
organised (Walker and Andrews, 2013).
While both explanatory approaches have merit, it is important to understand
which of the two approaches drives different local responses to EU policy. If
political explanations outweigh managerial ones, the remedy for non-
implementation is fundamentally different. Where the political approach assumes
that strict enforcement mechanisms can remedy nonimplementation, the man-
agement approach advocates for capacity-building strategies (see Tallberg, 2002). If
one sets out to improve local implementation of EU directives, we first need to
understand which of the two approaches drives different local responses to EU
policy. Hence, in this paper we address the following research question: to what
extent can differences in Dutch local implementation of an EU directive be attributed
to politicization or managerial considerations?
This study offers an empirical and theoretical contribution to the literature.
Empirically, by putting local government at the centre of this research we address
the empirical gap in EU compliance literature (Thomann and Sager, 2017; Treib,
2014). Furthermore, compared to the Water Framework Directive, the AAQ
directive has received less scholarly attention (for an overview see Bondarouk and
Mastenbroek, 2018).























































































































When it comes to theoretical contributions, by examining whether the expla-
natory variables identified for the variation in national compliance with EU poli-
cies also hold in the local context we explore the strength of implementation theory
(see Saetren, 2014: 86; Winter, 2012: 265). In addition, so far both managerial and
political explanations have been analysed mainly regarding the timeliness of EU
national implementation, i.e. whether EU legislation has been translated into
national law according to EU deadlines (see for an overview Treib, 2014). Alter-
natively, we focus on the content of policy implementation, i.e. the policy measures
that local government have taken in light of the AAQ directive. Thus, we enrich
our understanding of the explanatory variables by examining them in a different
conceptual context. By employing a theory-driven process tracing over a period of
10 years of local implementation in several Dutch municipalities, we identify the
sequence of explanatory variables. We thus illustrate how the variables interact and
affect implementation performance.
In analysing the antecedents of EU implementation performance, this study
focuses on the local implementation of the EU AAQ Directive in the Netherlands.
Bondarouk and Liefferink (2017) provide a database of Dutch local AAQ policy
output. Following a distribution-based most diverse case selection on the depen-
dent variable (Rohlfing, 2012), we selected the two highest and two lowest scoring
municipalities from the database developed by Bondarouk and Liefferink (2017).
The selection on the dependent variable is driven by our interest in what explains
different outcomes on the dependent variable, in this case implementation per-
formance. A selection of only medium-sized municipalities offers a focused com-
parison, as they form a rather homogeneous group with similar air pollution
sources, i.e. traffic, making them an almost ideal sample for horizontal comparison.
These Dutch municipalities enjoyed equal access to the national subsidies for AAQ
measures and experienced the same amount of steering from the national
government.
The next section sets out our conceptualisation of the dependent variable –
implementation performance. Afterwards, our expectations are outlined with
regard to political and management explanations. We address the case selection,
operationalisation and analysis techniques in full detail in the following section;
give short descriptions of the four cases before moving on to findings and
conclusions.
Delving into political and management theoretical approaches
Before we delve into the differences between political and management approaches,
we first need to address the conceptualisation of local implementation perfor-
mance. Local implementation of EU policies refers to the stage where local gov-
ernments put EU law into practice – ‘translate policy into action’ (Barrett, 2004:
251). The way local governments perform during local implementation can be
understood in terms of policy outputs – i.e. the regulatory actions taken in
response to law – or in terms of policy outcomes or impact – i.e. the question of
whether a policy indeed resolved the problem it set out to solve (for literature
review see Bondarouk and Mastenbroek, 2018: 17; Knill et al., 2012; Tosun, 2012).
An evaluation of EU policy impact is extremely challenging, due to the fact that
an isolation of the EU effect is practically impossible (Bauer and Knill, 2014;
Haverland, 2006; Tosun, 2012). Hence, one quickly faces ‘construct validity























































































































concerns’ when one tries to causally link EU policy with actual local state of
environmental pollution (Tosun, 2012: 442–444). Instead, a growing number of
scholars have suggested focusing on policy outputs in order to assess more directly
what the implementing actors do to mitigate the policy problem (Bondarouk and
Mastenbroek, 2018; Knill et al., 2012; Liefferink et al., 2009; Tosun, 2012). As in
this paper, we are interested in the differences between local policies in response to
an EU directive, we follow Bondarouk and Mastenbroek (2018) and conceptualise
implementation performance in terms of policy outputs.
An assessment of policy outputs presupposes a firm understanding of policy
measures: the techniques by which authorities attempt to change or maintain the
policy status quo (Howlett et al., 2009; May, 2003: 225; Schaffrin et al., 2015). These
measures are then examined on the content, i.e. the breadth and differentiation of
policy responses (Bauer and Knill, 2014: 33; Knill et al., 2012). Hence, we define
implementation performance as the comprehensiveness of policy outputs under-
taken by local implementers in response to the EU AAQ policy obligation. Thus we
are interested in explaining why local policy output in one municipality is more
elaborate than in another.
The political and management approaches to explaining implementation per-
formance have two different points of departure: respectively the willingness and
the ability to implement (for an extensive literature review, see Hill and Hupe,
2014). The political approach stresses the importance of political will to implement
policies. Politics determine the allocation of values and the distribution of benefits
and costs (Kingdon, 2014: 145). Therefore, implementation performance is seen to
reflect a deliberate choice. National policy makers, in response, can remedy low
implementation performance by strict and coercive enforcement (Tallberg, 2002).
The management approach, by contrast, assumes that implementation is not a
matter of calculated willingness, but of implementers’ capacity to do so (Tallberg,
2002; Treib, 2014; O’Toole and Meier, 2010). Sound management has been argued
to make a significant difference to policy implementation (see for an overview
Meier et al., 2007: 369; O’Toole and Meier, 2009: 499). Low implementation
performance is then attributed to implementers’ ability to implement, rather than
their willingness to do so. Based on these assumptions, implementation can be
improved by investing in capacity building (see Tallberg, 2002).
In the remainder of this section, we present the political and managerial vari-
ables to account for variance in implementation performance. However, we do not
claim to list all potential variables – ‘as has been widely recognised dozens of
variables are relevant to implementation action’ (O’Toole, 2017: 377). We speci-
fically focus on a few variables, which we would like to subject to empirical
investigation. For both approaches, the variables were selected that have been
repeatedly identified in different literature reviews as being correlated with com-
prehensive implementation performance. Such focused theory testing is embedded
in the current ‘third generation implementation research’ (for an overview see
Hupe and Saetren, 2015; Saetren, 2014). Instead of trying to be as complete as
possible in theoretical frameworks, the third generation implementation scholars
call for ‘testing partial theories and hypotheses’ that have been repeatedly identified
as being correlated with comprehensive implementation in order to strengthen
implementation theory, which for too long has been of an explorative or
descriptive nature (Winter, 2012: 265; see for literature reviews Bondarouk, 2017;
Hupe and Saetren, 2015; Saetren, 2014).























































































































Next to this multiplicity of explanatory variables, implementation research is
also characterised by equifinality of explanatory variables (e.g. Toshkov, 2011;
Treib, 2014; Winter, 2012). For this reason, we expect that several explanatory
variables together would form a potential explanation for the variance in imple-
mentation performance. As the literature does not provide guidance on the rela-
tionship between the variables, we do not a priori hypothesise any relationship
between different variables. However, the comparative process tracing in the
analysis allows us to distil the causal mechanism, illustrating how different vari-
ables are interrelated (see Benett and Checkel, 2014).
The political approach
The political approach is disentangled into four specific explanations: policy pre-
ferences, policy saliency, interest group pressure and policy entrepreneurship
(Kingdon, 2014; Lee and Koski, 2012; Saetren, 2014: 100; Versluis, 2007).
Policy preferences
At the municipal level, the local preferences regarding air quality policy, i.e. policy
positions, of key players are assumed to determine policy formulation and
implementation (Kingdon 2014; Henstra, 2010; May and Winter, 2009). In the
Netherlands, key local players are the local council, the college of aldermen and the
local policy officers, as they are responsible for implementing policies. As they all
have different policy purviews they are likely to have diverging preferences when it
comes to AAQ. For instance, a policy officer responsible for the mobility of public
and private transit might prioritise the speed of the traffic flow over concerns about
air pollution. There are many possible differences when it comes to actors’ pre-
ferences. We argue that there are two types of differences in policy preferences that
are important for implementation performance on AAQ.
First, AAQ policy preferences of the implementing officials tasked with
implementation of environmental policies, including AAQ, might be more or less
ambitious than the goals set out in the EU policy. The AAQ directive determines
minimum levels of air pollution, but member states and local governments are
allowed to set stricter norms. For instance, the World Health Organization sets
stricter norms than the EU policy (Bondarouk and Liefferink, 2017). Local gov-
ernments are also allowed to set a stricter deadline, for example the desired level of
pollution should be met earlier than the deadline prescribed in the directive.
Alternatively, local governments could be less ambitious and not adhere to the
deadlines or only do a bare minimum to meet the obligation of having an AAQ
policy plan in place. The reason for this could be that the implementing officers
give precedence to other objectives, for instance car mobility, than AAQ policy
objectives. The difference in policy preferences of implementing bodies and the
prescribed EU objectives is crucial for explaining noncompliance at national level
(see for a vast literature overview Treib, 2014; Angelova et al., 2012). Following the
same logic, the difference between what standards local governments prefer and
what the EU asks for may therefore influence how comprehensive implementation
performance will be on the ground.
Second, implementing officials may hold diverging AAQ preferences among
themselves (Henstra, 2010; Kingdon, 2014: 81; Lee and Koski, 2012; May and
Winter, 2009; Robichau and Lynn, 2009; Walker and Andrews, 2013). This means























































































































that some implementing officials may be in favour of prioritizing stricter AAQ
policy than the EU calls for, while others may be concerned with its impact on
other policies, like public and private transit policy, and advocate a more lenient
AAQ policy. Before implementing any measures, the officials will then have to
deliberate and reach consensus on what AAQ policy goals and measures are
appropriate and acceptable to everyone. As this consensus building is likely to be
difficult and time-consuming, they will be able to agree on fewer measures in the
case of stark policy preference differences than in the case where differences in
AAQ policy preferences are absent or easily overcome (see Andrews et al., 2012:
81). Hence, if the differences on AAQ policy preferences between key players are
too pronounced, implementation performance will suffer as actors will not be able
to agree on as many policy measures. Hence, policy output will be lower. Where
the policy preferences are aligned but not ambitious, it is unlikely that imple-
mentation performance will benefit from it.
Therefore, we expect that higher implementation performance on AAQ policy is
associated with more ambitious policy preferences than the EU policy calls for,
and these policy preferences have to be approximately equally ambitious and
shared among the key local players.
Policy saliency
Although policy saliency is strongly associated with policy preferences, it is ‘con-
ceptually and empirically distinct from actors’ policy positions’ (Thomson, 2011:
47). Policy saliency concerns the importance actors attach to a particular issue. It is
possible that stakeholders attach a high level of importance to an issue on which
they take a moderate position, and a low level of saliency to an issue on which they
take an extreme position (Thomson et al., 2012: 613).
Given the enormous amount of national policy implementation tasks
combined with limited resources, local actors pick and choose where to focus
their attention (Lipsky, 1980). The level of attention and effort paid to
implementation will depend on the importance local implementers attach to
that specific policy (Spendzharova and Versluis, 2013; Thomann 2015; Treib,
2014). High relative importance of a policy issue positively impacts local
implementers’ prioritisation and will be reflected in the implementation per-
formance. However, where policy saliency is high but implementers do not
support EU policy, policy saliency is unlikely to positively impact imple-
mentation performance.
Therefore we expect that higher implementation performance on AAQ policy is
associated with higher levels of AAQ saliency among local implementers in cases
where these implementers are (at least) supportive of EU AAQ policy goals.
Interest group pressure
Interest groups may target a policy issue and advocate a specific set of measures,
thus creating an incentive for policy implementers to act (see Binder and
Neumayer, 2005; Cheon and Urpelainen, 2013; Henstra, 2010; Kingdon, 2014;
Spendzharova and Versluis, 2013; Thomson et al., 2012; Warntjen, 2012). Several
EU compliance studies looking at the national level of EU policy implementation
have shown that groups whose members profit from a particular EU policy will try























































































































to influence policy implementation by means of, for instance, lobbying or public
shaming (see Treib, 2014 for an overview).
In the same vein one could argue that local interest groups would try to exert
influence on the AAQ local policy. At the municipal level such locally organised
advocacy represents direct ties to local constituencies (Henstra, 2010).
Spendzharova and Versluis (2013: 1504) show that ‘when an issue receives a lot of
political and social attention, there is an extra effort to do things right’ and to take
policy measures that reflect stakeholders’ preferences. Hence, local interest groups,
such as environmental organisations, health organisations or other civil society
organisations, may raise the stakes for local implementers to make an effort in
implementing AAQ policy, while other interest groups would like to see a less strict
AAQ policy (Lee and Koski, 2012).
The composition of an interest group constellation at a local level plays an
important role in determining how extensive AAQ policy will be. Local interest
groups may differ in their position on how comprehensive the AAQ policy should
be. Cheon and Urpeilanen (2013) point out that supporters of ambitious renewable
electricity policy plans are decisive in the absence of opposition (see also Binder
and Neumayer, 2005), but the positive effect diminishes with the strength of
opposition. Hence, if there is a balance of powers between the proponents and the
opponents, implementation performance is likely to be less comprehensive when
compared to a situation where supporters of AAQ policy dominate in the city. If
opposition to AAQ measures is strong it is also likely to negatively impact the AAQ
policy output. In such a case, the AAQ policy would be quite minimal and sym-
bolic in nature.
Therefore, we expect that higher implementation performance on AAQ policy is
associated with environmental, health and civil society organizations who are
predominantly supportive of EU AAQ policy goals.
Policy entrepreneurship
The final political variable, policy entrepreneurship, is not bound to individuals
within the local administration and can be found anywhere (Kingdon, 2014;
Meijerink and Huitema, 2010). The main characteristic of policy entrepreneurs is
their willingness “to invest their resources-time, energy, reputation, and sometimes
money in pushing their proposals or problems, […] prompting important people
to pay attention, coupling solutions to problems and coupling both problems and
solutions to politics” (Kingdon, 2014: 122). Sabatier and Mazmanian (1980: 553)
pointed to the importance of “commitment of supportive implementing officials”
in affecting policy outputs by going beyond “what could reasonably be expected in
using the available resources”. These individuals are able to balance advocacy and
brokerage strategies to achieve their goals and know exactly how to operate the
administrative apparatus and mobilise group efforts (Gabris et al., 2001; Meijerink
and Huitema, 2010). Policy entrepreneurs are always on the lookout for new policy
opportunities, are innovative and risk-taking (see Andrews et al., 2012; Meier et al.,
2007; Walker et al., 2010).
Therefore, we expect that higher implementation performance on AAQ policy is
positively associated with aldermen and policy officers exhibiting policy entre-
preneur characteristics.
























































































































The management approach is detailed in four specific explanations: internal
coordination, external coordination, policy experience and knowledge, and
personnel stability (see for overview Saetren, 2014: 100; Walker and Andrews,
2013; Bondarouk, 2017).1
Internal coordination
As policy implementation typically involves various government departments,
effective coordination between them enhances compliance (Toshkov, 2011; Treib,
2014) and implementation performance (see Andrews et al., 2012). Effective
coordination enables the organisation to shepherd actions, processes and efforts
towards one common policy goal (Andrews et al., 2012) and create a shared
understanding of the policy vision throughout the organisation (Jordan and
Lenschow, 2000; May and Winter, 2009; Saurugger, 2012; Walker and Andrews,
2013). The systematic literature review by Bondarouk (2017) also shows that
internal coordination could produce more integrated policy approaches, which
would benefit comprehensive implementation performance.
This common policy vision can be achieved with either formal or informal
coordination mechanisms. An example of formal mechanisms is project groups in
which staff from different departments participate. These groups “have rules or
operating procedures on how often to meet, who prepares meetings, problem
solving, and so on” (Schout and Jordan, 2005: 2010). Alternatively, a shared
understanding of the policy direction can be achieved through frequent informal
communication between departments (Schout and Jordan, 2005).
Therefore, we expect that higher implementation performance on AAQ policy is
associated with frequent formal and/or informal interdepartmental coordina-
tion on this policy.
External coordination
A single municipality cannot assess all information on a given policy by itself,
especially when it comes in the form of a policy as complicated as air policy. An
infrastructure for external (formal or informal) deliberation or networking facil-
itates high implementation performance (Betsill and Bulkeley, 2004; Jänicke, 2005;
Walker and Andrews, 2013). Policy implementers may use their networks to
support and enrich their policy initiatives (Mintrom and Norman, 2009). At the
same time, by networking or deliberating, policy implementers may strengthen the
legitimisation of their policy proposals (Meijerink and Huitema, 2010; Rousselin,
2016).
Therefore, we expect that higher implementation performance on AAQ policy is
associated with frequent formal and/or informal coordination with external
stakeholders on this policy.
1An additional management variable to explain high implementation performance is the availability of
financial resources (Treib, 2014; Walker and Andrews, 2013). Yet, Dutch municipalities had equal access to
financial funding for the air quality measures made available by the Dutch central government. Thus, this
explanation was not taken on board.























































































































Policy experience and knowledge
Municipalities’ human resources, i.e. their knowledge and policy experience, are
also argued to contribute to comprehensive implementation performance (O’Toole
and Meier, 2009, 2010; Walker and Andrews, 2013: 106). Some municipalities may
employ better schooled and experienced policy officers than others. Policy officers
with relevant education and years of experience can effectively boost imple-
mentation performance (Gabris et al., 2001; O’Toole and Meier, 2010; Treib, 2014).
Therefore, we expect that higher implementation performance on AAQ policy is
associated with higher levels of knowledge and policy experience.
Personnel stability
Personnel stability is the final managerial variable alleged to affect implementation
performance (Walker and Andrews, 2013; Meijerink and Huitema, 2010). High
personnel turnover has been argued to disrupt established patterns of coordination
and cooperation between different municipal organisational echelons, which can
negatively affect implementation performance (Andrews et al., 2012: 80; Henstra,
2010: 244; Meier et al., 2007: 366). Changes in personnel can be harmful to
implementation performance because of the loss of policy knowledge and skills and
the costs of training new staff (Walker and Andrews, 2013: 115).
Therefore, we expect that higher implementation performance on AAQ policy is
associated with higher levels of personnel stability.
Research design
The AAQ directive is a typical EU environmental directive containing both sub-
stantive and procedural provisions. It establishes air quality objectives, such as
standards for the concentrations of specific air pollutants, and calls for the
assessment, monitoring, improvement and sustainment of air quality through
rigorous air quality plans. Agglomerations where air quality norms are expected
not to be met are required to have a plan of action to improve air quality.
In the Netherlands, the AAQ directive has been transposed into the Environ-
mental Protection Act (EPA), which lays the basis for the National Air Quality
Cooperation Programme (NAQCP). The limit values are the same as in the EU
directive. Although the directive and the transposition focus on other pollutants as
well, NAQCP identified particulate matter ten and nitrogen dioxide, resulting from
fossil fuel combustion processes, as the only pollutants being exceeded in the
Netherlands. In urban outdoor air, the presence of both pollutants is mainly due to
traffic. The Dutch national government is responsible for taxes on polluting cars
and fuel, and traffic flows on national highways. The Dutch municipalities are
responsible for limiting exposure to pollutants at urban level. For example, this can
be achieved by setting higher environmental standards for urban public transport
vehicles through public procurement, rearranging traffic flow management, or
through the encouragement of environmentally friendly ways of providing trans-
portation (Bondarouk and Liefferink, 2017; Fransen, 2012; Van Oort and Van
Oort, 2012; Van Rij and Brink, 2013).
The Netherlands present an interesting case for investigating whether differ-
ences in local AAQ policy implementation performance can be attributed to
political or management explanations. Dutch municipalities form a very























































































































homogeneous group. First, almost all Dutch municipalities are faced with
approximately the same geographical conditions that affect air quality (Busch et al.,
2012; Busscher et al., 2014). Hence, differences in geographical conditions among
the municipalities cannot explain differences in policy output. Second, we selected
medium-sized municipalities for the analysis, as they represent a large and
homogeneous portion of Dutch society, making them an almost ideal sample for
horizontal comparison.2 Unlike bigger municipalities where there are harbours and
airports, which tend to have a heavily negative effect on air quality, these medium-
sized municipalities are also very similar when it comes to physical sources of
pollution. Regional and urban traffic is the biggest source of pollution in these
municipalities (Bondarouk and Liefferink, 2017; Fransen, 2012; Van Oort and Van
Oort, 2012; Van Rij and Brink, 2013). Thus, they all hypothetically could take
similar measures. Moreover, all municipalities had to take several measures at the
same time, as it is the combination of different measures taken together that can
make a difference (Fransen, 2012; Van Oort and Van Oort, 2012; Van Rij and
Brink, 2013). Taken separately, each measure does not contribute that much to the
improvement of AAQ. For example, next to discouraging car-use, it makes sense to
encourage and facilitate other sorts of transportation at the same time.
Third, Wood et al. (2014: 534) identified that regulatory pressure from the
national government can account for differences in local implementation. Having
ample discretion in deciding on AAQ measures (Bondarouk and Liefferink, 2017),
Dutch municipalities have experienced equal pressure from the national govern-
ment. And finally, the medium-sized municipalities had very similar municipal
budgets and drew comparatively similarly from the available national funds. Dutch
municipalities had equal access to the national subsidies for AAQ measures
(Bondarouk and Liefferink, 2017). Hence, differences in implementation perfor-
mance in our sample cannot be attributed to geographical conditions, differential
national steering or financial resources.
Despite eliminating these rival explanations for the differences in implementa-
tion performance through careful case selection, we needed to control for a strong
alternative explanation. If municipalities start with different levels of air pollution,
i.e. the AAQ pressure, then the severity of environmental problem might explain
why some municipalities took more measures than others (see also Henstra, 2010;
Wood et al., 2014; Zahran et al., 2008). We control for this explanation by selecting
municipalities from two groups: those that did and those that did not have an air
pollution problem to start with. In 2008, the national government identified several
municipalities that, despite national air quality measures, would still exceed the EU
norms by 2015. Facing more persistent air pollution, these municipalities can be
expected to take extra local measures next to national measures, compared to
municipalities without the forecasted AAQ norms exceedance.
The measurement of implementation performance was based on the secondary
database from Bondarouk and Liefferink’s (2017) study on local AAQ imple-
mentation performance. They provide a ranking of medium-sized municipalities
based on their AAQ implementation performance along with an extensive code-
book, detailing what measures were taken over the 2005–2015 period. Hence, they
have mapped which municipalities were more comprehensive in their policy
output than others. Bondarouk and Liefferink (2017) based their ranking on the
2Dutch medium-sized municipalities have between 150 thousand and 340 thousand inhabitants.























































































































measures that were actually taken, so not the measures that were only decided
upon in the management plans but the measures that the local governments ended
up implementing. They have identified six categories of all AAQ policy measures
the local governments took in that period (see also Fransen, 2012; Van Oort & Van
Oort, 2012; Van Rij and Brink, 2013). The six categories of air quality measures are
(1) public transport, (2) prevention of cars in the city, (3) bicycle policy, (4)
stimulating the demand for alternative transportation, (5) information for the
public and (6) sensitive destination measures. The measures in these categories
were coded along five aspects: how comprehensive the measures were, the
territorial and temporal scope of the measures, how broad the target group of AAQ
measures was, and whether there was any form of monitoring envisioned for the
policy instruments. A policy measure received a higher score per aspect if more
descriptions from the long-list of all possible policy practices could be ‘ticked’ for
the city in question. To come up with an aggregate score for one of the six
categories of measures, the scores on the individual measures of the same category
were added up. We have included the summary of Bondarouk and Liefferink’s
(2017) codebook in online Annex A. It also describes all AAQ measures that the
medium-sized municipalities actually took.
For the selection of municipalities, we employed the most diverse distribution-
based case selection on the dependent variable method (Rohlfing, 2012) as it allows
us to explain the variation in implementation performance. The selection on the
dependent variable is warranted as this research is Y-centred (Gerring, 2001: 137;
see also George and Bennett, 2005: 218; Blatter and Haverland, 2012; Rohlfing,
2008; Rohlfing, 2012). Y-centred research aims to analyse whether variance on the
dependent variable can be associated with certain independent variables. “The
starting point of the analysis is the dependent variable and within-case analysis
moves backward to determine the relevant independent variables” (Rohlfing, 2008:
1505). This is different to X-centred research which tests whether and to what
extent certain independent variables lead to certain levels of the dependent vari-
able. In X-centred research, the independent variable is the starting point for the
process tracing analysis (Rohlfing, 2008: 1505).
We selected four municipalities from the Bondarouk and Liefferink (2017)
database based on the scores on the implementation performance. It should be
noted that the least-performing municipalities are still compliant with EU direc-
tives, as they have an AAQ plan and met AAQ standards. Relative to their best-
performing peers though, the least-performing municipalities took less extensive
measures. The database was first divided into two groups: municipalities that did
and those that did not have an air pollution problem to start with. From each
group of municipalities we selected two highest- and two least-performing
municipalities. In this way, we aimed to control for the severity of environmental
problem that could potentially explain why some municipalities took more mea-
sures than others. In order to safeguard the anonymity that was promised to the
respondents, the municipalities are labelled as A and B (the best performing
municipalities), and C and D (the least performing). A and C have a high, B and D
a low AAQ pressure.
Data on explanatory variables were gathered through document analysis and
interviews with 37 respondents who were involved in AAQ policy in the period of
2005-2015. Even though the directive’s transposition deadline was in 2009, we
analysed data in the time frame of 2005–2015. This broader time frame allowed for























































































































sounder process tracing as we could fully capture the AAQ measures, which some
municipalities had taken prior to the formal transposition. In each municipality we
interviewed policy officers from environment, traffic and transit departments;
aldermen with environment, traffic and transit affairs in their portfolios; con-
sultants involved in the implementation process, local environmental groups, local
Community Health Services (GGDs), local industries or companies affected by
local air quality policy, and local citizens’ associations. In order to obtain an overall
impression of local implementation practices and trends, we also conducted
interviews with a number of national actors: the Ministry of Infrastructure and the
Environment, the Association of Community Health Services, the National Insti-
tute for Public Health and the Environment (RIVM), consultancies, and the
national Court of Audit. A list of respondents is provided in online Annex B.
Based on these interviews, the explanatory variables were coded as high, med-
ium or low. Within the authors’ team, we have thoroughly discussed the data and
the coding of the explanatory variables. Due to this extensive coordination we did
not perform an inter-coder reliability test. As this was a comparative case study the
coding represents relative values in the case studies. As we have gathered data over
ten years, we had to comprise the data in order to be able to compare it. Table 1
presents the operationalisation and coding scheme for the explanatory variables.3
We used the following steps to analyse the data. First, this methodological
design rests on the classic principle in logic that as long as the cases are similar in
all other relevant aspects, differences in dependent variable are explained by dif-
ferences in independent variables (Denk, 2010). Thus, the codes on the explanatory
variables are to covary with the codes on the dependent variable in order for them
to be considered as potential explanations for implementation performance.
Hence, we first eliminated variables in our cross-case comparison that did not
covary with the dependent variable. As implementation research is characterised by
equifinality of explanatory variables (e.g. Toshkov, 2011; Treib, 2014; Winter,
2012), we expected that several explanatory variables together would form a
potential explanation for the variance in implementation performance. Therefore,
several explanatory variables were expected to survive the elimination round.
Second, we employed process tracing of individual cases to identify the sequence
and interrelation of the variables that survived the elimination round (see Bennett
and Checkel, 2014). These variables served as theoretical clues to guide the process
tracing of within-case analysis (Bennett and Checkel, 2014: 7). The individual
within-case analyses were then compared among each other in order to reach
sounder conclusions on the causal mechanisms and interactions at play.
In addition, following the conventional method of process tracing, we also kept
an eye on potential alternative explanations that could emerge from the data (see
Bennett and Checkel, 2014). Party politics is one of the explanations that has been
identified as accounting for EU compliance (see for an overview Treib, 2014;
Thomson, 2010: 582; Mastenbroek and Kaeding, 2006). Even though this expla-
nation is very intuitive, especially if one examines political explanations, the lit-
erature does not offer consistent findings (see for an overview Treib, 2014: 22). The
partisan effect is difficult to operationalise in longitudinal studies and depends on
policy sector in terms of what effect can be hypothesised (Treib, 2014: 22). Yet, it is
almost intuitively important to check for this explanation in our data.
3Saliency has been operationalised in line with Warntjen’s recommendations (2012: 168).























































































































Table 1. Operationalisation of explanatory variables
High Medium Low
Policy preferences 1. Higher AAQ standards than EU standards
AND
2. All key players share equally ambitious
policy positions
1. Higher AAQ standards than EU
standards OR
2. All key players share equally
ambitious policy positions
1. AAQ standards are the same as EU
standards AND
2. Key players do not share equally
ambitious policy positions
Policy saliency Local policy implementers, local environmental groups, consultancies, and municipal health services:
– indicated that AAQ policy enjoyed priority
at local administration in the past 10
years
– indicated that AAQ policy enjoyed
various degrees of priority at local
administration in the past 10
years
– did not indicate that AAQ policy enjoyed
priority at local administration in the past
10 years
Interest group pressure Many local interest groups systematically
pressured implementing actors on a
constant basis in the past 10 years. If
pressure came from predominantly
supporters of AAQ policy it was marked
as High+, if opponents then High−
Local AAQ policy opponents (marked
as Medium−) and/or proponents
(marked as Medium+) pressured
implementing actors on a sporadic
basis in the past 10 years
Only a single local AAQ policy opponent
(marked as Low−) or proponent (marked
as Low+) pressured implementing actors
on a sporadic basis in the past 10 years
Policy entrepreneurship Policy officers and aldermen exhibited the
following entrepreneurial characteristics:
Policy officers or aldermen exhibited
the following entrepreneurial
characteristics:
Policy officers and/or aldermen exhibited
one or two of the entrepreneurial
characteristics:
– focused on seeking new policy opportunities,
- were relatively more proactive and risk taking than other municipalities’ policy actors,
– invested their time, energy and reputation to improve policy implementation,
– acted as connecting pins between different stakeholders,
– knew how to operate the administrative apparatus to find resources for policy implementation
(See Andrews et al., 2012: 81; Meier et al., 2007: 362; Meijerink and Huitema, 2010; Walker et al., 2010)
Internal coordination Coordination was systematic and frequent
among departments in form of project
groups, committees, or informal channels
of communication at the level of
aldermen and policy officers
Coordination occurred on a regular
basis between two departments at
the level of aldermen and/or
policy officers
Coordination was very sporadic, lasted for
only a few years and occurred only at the
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Table 1. Continued
High Medium Low
External coordination Regular coordination with at least six of the
following groups:
Regular coordination with four or five
of the following groups:
Regular coordination with maximum three of
the following groups:
~ ministry, regional government, other local governments, local businesses, universities or think-tanks, environmental groups, health
organisations, civil society organisations (See Meier et al., 2007).
Policy experience and
knowledge
Policy officers were busy with AAQ and
integration of (environmental) issues
within other policy domains for more than
10 years, and had relevant educational
background.
Policy officers were busy with AAQ
and integration of (environmental)
issues within other policy domains
since 2009, and had relevant
educational background.
Policy officers were busy with AAQ and
integration of (environmental) issues
within other policy domains only since
recently, i.e. in the past 3 years, and had
no relevant educational background.
Personnel stability Policy officers of the first responsible
department (i.e. environment) stayed in
the same department for more than 10
years.
Policy officers of the first responsible
department (i.e. environment)
were hired since 2009.
The policy officers of the first responsible
department (i.e. environment) were hired
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In the next section, we present the case descriptions, based on document ana-




This municipality scored high on implementation performance. This means that it
took most measures, which were also generally more extensive, targeted larger
parts of the population, had wider territorial scope, and the AAQ measures had
been in place for a longer time than in other municipalities.
Air pollution enjoyed high saliency in this municipality for health reasons. A
report by the Community Health Service identified air pollution as a cause for the
high number of cancer patients in one of the districts. This report spurred a long
institutionalised discussion between the municipal administration, local industry
representatives, and civil society organisations. A platform was established which
brought these different stakeholders together twice a year to discuss, i.e. health
impacts of various municipal infrastructural projects. The heavy industry in the
city was cooperating with the municipality’s administration and was sympathetic
to AAQ ambitious local policy.4 Together they wanted to ensure that the city had a
progressive environmental policy with green modes of transportation. In order to
reassure the public that the municipality was doing all it could to safeguard the
health of its citizens, the aldermen and policy officers from environment, and
traffic and transit departments were highly committed to taking as many policy
measures as possible to achieve higher air quality than the AAQ directive called for.
In addition, many respondents characterised the aldermen and policy officers
involved in AAQ policy as intrinsically and idealistically driven to improve AAQ.
Both groups of actors were very knowledgeable on environmental issues. They
were known for being open to new avenues of improving environment quality,
even across municipal borders. They were involved in various national and inter-
municipal projects. Political and administrative actors of the environmental
department worked very closely with each other, as well as with the traffic and
transit department’s political and administrative actors. This close cooperation
even resulted in the restructuring of these administrative units into a single
department.
Municipality B
This municipality also scored high on AAQ implementation performance. This
means that it took a lot of AAQ measures, which were generally more extensive,
targeted larger parts of population, had wider territorial scope, and the measures
had been at place already for a longer time than in other municipalities.
In municipality B, similar to municipality A, AAQ was framed in terms of
health. As early as 2000, a local pulmonologist raised concerns about the high
number of lung patients in the municipality. Policy officers from the
4It is important to bear in mind that the AAQ directive does not target industry emissions. The only
pollutant values that were still exceeded in the Netherlands are particulate matter ten and nitrogen dioxide
in specific urban settings characterized by intensive traffic.























































































































environmental department picked up the issue and invited a consultancy firm to
calculate the health benefits of establishing an environmental zone. These calcu-
lations were crucial in swaying the alderman of environmental issues, who here-
after became a fierce proponent of the environmental zone and strongly advocated
extensive AAQ measures and going beyond existing EU norms.
This alderman instructed his policy officers to ensure broad public and
administrative support for the environmental zone, as this would enable the
adopting of more extensive measures. If necessary, the alderman declared himself
willing to push the issue through the council anyway. The environmental
department hired a consultancy firm specialised in tackling multi-faceted issues
characterised by a large number of different stakeholders with very diverging
interests to coordinate the policy internally and externally. This consultancy firm
managed to create broad support within the municipality apparatus and among
local and regional partners, and taught the environmental policy officers how to
maintain this support. Local interest groups were not visible in these discussions,
with the exception of representatives of city centre shop owners, that were ham-
pered by the environmental zone arrangements. Yet, the municipality managed to
cooperate with them and to ensure that they also supported ambitious AAQ policy.
The local city centre shop owners were facilitated in their management of goods
supply. In this way, the traffic within the city was minimised. The key to getting
everyone on board (including city centre shop owners) was to focus on the benefits
for the citizens’ well-being. In addition to this consultancy firm, a special policy
officer responsible for the integration of municipal policies boosted close inter-
departmental cooperation further.
Many respondents credited the environmental policy officers for their knowl-
edge, their drive and their passion, viewing this as a cause for the municipality’s
high implementation performance. Municipality B was selected by the national
government as an example of how to organise an environmental zone, and
environmental policy officers were asked to present their experience at different
national meetings.
Municipality C
This municipality scored low on implementation performance. It took fewer AAQ
measures, which were also less extensive in terms of target group and territorial
scope. The measures were also taken rather late, as compared to municipalities
A and B.
Unlike in municipalities A and B, AAQ was seen as a transit issue and not so
much related to health. Currently, though, policy officers try to link air quality to
sustainability and energy issues to make it more palatable to politicians. Over the
years, local environmental policy officers did their best to push through more
ambitious AAQ objectives. In contrast to the policy officers, the alderman first
dealing with the issue was merely motivated to reach the EU norms by 2015. In
2010, a more committed and entrepreneurial alderman was installed. She was even
nominated for the Greenest Politician award of the year. Although this alderman
was just as committed to AAQ policy as her environmental policy officers, together
they were not able to persuade the council to adopt more ambitious AAQ mea-
sures. The council simply did not see the need or urgency of going beyond EU
norms or taking a lot of measures. Only by 2014 did they manage to install an























































































































environmental zone. When it comes to interest group’s pressure, the local Cyclists’
Union and a local environmental group sporadically pushed for more extensive
policy measures over the years. The representatives of city centre shop owners,
which were negatively affected by the changes in traffic circulation, did not manage
to voice their concerns in the council about the change in customers’ access to
their shops.
The policy officers were very knowledgeable and experienced in air pollution
prevention. They cooperated on a regular basis with the Community Health Ser-
vice and were well connected nationally and internationally, participating in dif-
ferent associations and networks. The traffic and transit department cooperated
informally with the environmental department. Over the years, the cooperation
intensified and ebbed. When the alderman had both environment and transit in his
dossier, the administrative units worked together more closely.
Municipality D
This municipality also scored low on implementation performance. It also took
fewer AAQ measures, which were less extensive, targeting not as a large group of
population or a territorial scope. The measures were also taken rather late as
compared to municipalities A and B.
AAQ did not enjoy full political or administrative attention, as financial mis-
management and internal reorganisations dominated the agenda. The policy officer
and alderman merely aimed to reach the EU norms. Just like in municipality C,
AAQ was associated with transit rather than health. Only recently a local civil
society organisation actively raised health concerns, starting to lobby for stricter
standards and more policy measures. So far this has been the only interest group
concerned with AAQ in municipality D. There was no interest group opposing the
AAQ measures.
The city council demanded an ex-ante evaluation of the effect on AAQ of all
measures that were considered for adoption. This process stalled the actual
adoption of measures. As different respondents claimed, the need to justify all
AAQ measures with calculations could be seen as a pretext not to take any mea-
sures at all, as calculations are time-consuming and often do not generate con-
clusive recommendations. This ‘policy hesitance’ laid bare the lack of a policy
entrepreneur who would have taken the risk of breaking the deadlock and rejecting
the demands for further calculations on basis of a too tardy process, enough data
being available and the inconclusiveness of these calculations.
In contrast to the other three municipalities, the internal coordination was very
sporadic and only occurred when specific infrastructure projects called for coop-
eration between the departments. There was virtually no coordination on the
political level. External coordination was limited as well, compared to the other
three municipalities. The policy officers were knowledgeable and experienced in air
pollution prevention.
Analysis
This section presents the patterns, similarities and differences among the muni-
cipalities. Table 2 schematically presents the findings for all four municipalities. We
first eliminate the explanatory variables that do not covary with the dependent























































































































variable. Table 2 assists in this first crosscase analysis. We then proceed with the
comparative within-case analysis to go into more depth, to identify the interaction
of variables, and to isolate causal mechanisms. Following the conventional method
of process tracing, we also reflect on potential alternative explanations (see Bennett
and Checkel, 2014).
Table 2 shows that the political variables covary with the dependent variable of
implementation performance more strongly than the management variables.
Contrary to scores on the political variables, all municipalities scored very similarly
on external coordination, policy knowledge and experience, and personnel stability.
This lack of variation means that these management variables cannot explain the
differences in implementation performance. Yet, it is important to note that as all
municipalities formally complied with an obligation to have a plan, these variables
may account for the fact that these municipalities complied with this procedural
provision in the first place. Though interesting in itself, this finding is nevertheless
of secondary importance in this study as we are interested in differences in
implementation performance.
Zooming in on the political variables in Table 2, two observations stand out.
First, Table 2 shows that interest group pressure does not covary with the high
scores for implementation performance. Thus, it does not constitute a necessary
condition for high implementation performance. Interestingly though, the scores
on interest group pressure seem to correlate with the level of AAQ pressure. This
suggests that interest group pressure intensifies with the level of environmental
problem pressure. What the empirics also showed is that there was almost no
opposition from interest groups against AAQ measures. In municipality B, there
was one interest group of city-centre shop owners that voiced its concerns about
the reachability of their shops if the municipality were to ban vehicles from the city
centre with the new environmental zone (Respondents: 17–19, 21). Yet, very
quickly the policy officers managed to convince them that this would not be a
problem (Respondents: 17–19, 21). Hence, the city-centre shop owners were
swayed over to support the environmental zone. In other cities, there was no
Table 2. Schematic representation of the findings in four municipalities




High High Low Low
Control variable
AAQ pressure High Low High Low
Political approach
Policy preferences High High Medium Low
Policy saliency High High Low Low
Interest group pressure+ / − High+ Low− Medium+ Low+
Policy entrepreneurship High High Medium Low
Management approach
Internal coordination High High Medium Low
External coordination High High High Medium
Policy experience and
knowledge
High High High High
Personnel stability High High High High
Note: “ + ” signifies pro-strict AAQ measures interest group pressure, “−” signifies anti-strict AAQ measures interest group
pressure.























































































































opposition of any significance at all. While more research is required to explain this
phenomenon, a possible explanation emerged from the interviews. The car and
transport industry that is affected by traffic-reducing AAQ measures operates in
the Netherlands on a national level (Respondents: 1 and 4). Hence, they would try
to represent their interest on a national rather than a local level.
A second observation based on Table 2 is that policy saliency seems to covary
perfectly with the dependent variable. The difference in saliency can be linked to
the type of framing of AAQ. In municipalities A and B, AAQ policy was framed as
a health issue (Respondents: 5, 11, 13–23), while C and D framed it as a transit
issue (Respondents: 24–26, 32, 33, 35, 37). This could explain the high saliency of
AAQ policy in A and B, as generally health issues are considered to be more urgent
in local politics than transit issues.
In addition to policy saliency, policy preferences and policy entrepreneurship
covary to some extent with implementation performance (Table 2). Comparative
process tracing suggests that high saliency alone is not enough to result in high
implementation performance. In case B, the AAQ issue was salient to the policy
officers, but in the beginning of the process political actors were not yet as
ambitious as policy officers (Respondents: 5, 17–19, 22, 23). Highly entrepreneurial
and committed policy officers were crucial in convincing the political actors of the
necessity of extensive measures (Respondents: 5, 17–19, 21–24). Case C illustrates
that low saliency (Respondents: 24, 27, 29, 30) provided room for differences in
policy preferences among political actors (Respondents: 24, 27, 30). As AAQ was
not considered urgent by the city council, the ambitious preferences of entrepre-
neurial policy officers were not sufficient to convince the alderman first dealing
with the issue and the city council of the necessity of extensive AAQ policy
(Respondents: 24–28, 30, 31). Only in 2010 with the new alderman, who was more
entrepreneurial and committed to the AAQ policy, were the policy officers able to
successfully advocate for more extensive measures. However, still the city council
did not favour extensive measures, and thus municipality C could take fewer
measures than municipalities A and B. In Case A, AAQ enjoyed high saliency
among policy officers and political actors. The ambitious policy preferences were
necessary to signal their commitment to the far-reaching AAQ policy to the public
(Respondents: 5–16). As political and administrative actors were highly entrepre-
neurial, this exacerbated their policy efforts (Respondents: 5–16). In case D, finally,
there was no policy saliency to begin with (Respondents: 32–36). This coincided
with less entrepreneurial policy officers and political actors (Respondents: 32–35,
37). The city council was highly critical of the policy ambitions of the alderman
and the policy officers, requesting detailed cost-benefit calculations of all AAQ
policy measures (Respondents: 32–35). This resulted in a protracted process of
approving budgets for the policy (Respondents: 5, 32, 33, 35). In sum, policy
saliency, preferences and entrepreneurial activity of political actors and policy
officers, if ambitiously aligned, can reinforce each other, resulting in higher
implementation performance.
Next to these differences on political variables, there is one notable difference in
how internal coordination, i.e. the management variable, was organised in the best
and the least performing municipalities (Table 2). Municipalities A and B exhibited
extensive coordination within the administration and with the political apparatus.
Especially municipality B put a lot of effort into establishing effective forms of
internal policy coordination (Respondents: 17–22). Even so, this explanatory factor























































































































seems to covary less consistently with implementation performance than the policy
saliency variable (see Table 2). Whereas it clearly facilitated the communication
and exchange of ideas between the administrative stakeholders, which enabled
more measures to be taken (Respondents: 16–22, 24, 25, 27, 35), it does not seem to
be a sufficient condition on its own and needs to coincide with other explanatory
variables like policy saliency, preferences and entrepreneurship to be able to
positively impact implementation performance.
Finally, concerning potential alternative explanations, our empirical data over
10 years gives rise to an interesting observation regarding the impact of political
party affiliation of aldermen and electoral change (Table 3). Electoral change
seemed to matter in municipality C (Respondents: 24, 26, 27). A more committed,
entrepreneurial alderman from the liberal party replaced a less committed one
from the Christian-democrat party (Respondents: 24, 26, 27). Even though the
Dutch liberal party is known for favouring car-friendly policies, this liberal
alderman was in favour of far reaching traffic-limiting measures. Thus more AAQ
measures could be taken.
At the same time, a change of aldermen did not seem to make a difference for
the implementation performance in municipality B, where a labour alderman
succeeded a local party alderman (Respondents: 17, 18, 20, 21). Here one could not
expect a labour alderman to continue with an ambitious green policy of his local
party predecessor. Nevertheless, both were equally ambitious. Neither was imple-
mentation performance affected by an electoral change in municipality D. Here, a
liberal-democrat alderman took over from a left green alderman (Respondents: 35,
36, 37). One could have expected that a liberal democrat would have to deal with
the green legacy of his predecessor, but the policy preferences of both aldermen
were similar and equally unambitious. Municipality A had the same left green
alderman during the entire period of investigation. Thus, the political party
affiliation of aldermen and change of aldermen on its own cannot explain the
differences in implementation performance in our sample.
Conclusion
We examined to what extent differences in local implementation performance can
be attributed to the political and managerial variables derived from EU compliance
and implementation research. Our analysis shows that differences in local imple-
mentation performance are better explained by the political approach than by the
management approach. Hence, the national politicisation of EU policies continues
at the local level as well. This finding illustrates the necessity to look beyond
Table 3. Alternative explanations
A B C D
Dependent variable
AAQ implementation performance High High Low Low
Control variable
AAQ pressure High Low High Low
Political party affiliation of alderman
First period Left green* Local party* Christian- democrats Left green
Second period Left green* Labour* Liberal* Liberal democrats
Note: *Ambitious AAQ policy preferences.























































































































national level to see how EU plays out on the ground. As the EU often sets
minimum targets or employs procedural policy instruments, we need to examine
why some implementers do more than others to understand how member states
make EU policies work.
By conducting a theory-driven comparative within-case analysis, we com-
plemented earlier research on policy saliency showing how saliency may interact
with other variables. High policy saliency emerged as the driving force, which in
combination with ambitious policy preferences and entrepreneurship of both
policy officers and political actors determined high implementation performance.
In addition to this, frequent internal coordination contributed to high imple-
mentation performance, by enabling and strengthening the preference alignment of
policy officers and political actors.
While political variables explain the differences between municipalities in the
Netherlands, the management variables might be conducive to another outcome.
All municipalities comply with the procedural obligation to have an AAQ man-
agement plan in the first place. Hence, while similar scores on management
variables cannot explain the differences between municipalities, they could explain
the same outcome on compliance. Thus, politicisation explains the differences in
implementation performance, but management variables could explain the com-
pliance record in our cases. Whether the latter is indeed the case, should be
subjected to rigorous comparative research.
When it comes to the representativeness of our findings we may reasonably
expect that differences in environmental policy implementation performance in
medium-sized municipalities of (at least) North-western EU member states will
exhibit the same causal mechanism. These member states are characterised by
relatively similar environmental awareness and economic development. At the
same time, we expect that the observed causal mechanism, driven by policy sal-
iency, will also be at play during the implementation of other policies. However,
whether this is the case should be examined in future research.
This analysis identified two peculiarities, which call for further research on EU
implementation. First, the framing of environmental issues as health issues was
found to have played an important role in the implementation of the AAQ
directive as it resulted in higher policy saliency when compared to cases where
AAQ was framed as a transit issue. How the framing dynamic exactly impacts
saliency and, in turn, policy implementation should be examined in more depth.
Second, despite the observed politicisation of EU implementation at the local level,
our analysis sketched a limited effect of local council elections on the imple-
mentation performance. Aldermen behaved differently from what one may have
expected if one relied on only their political affiliation. More in-depth research is
needed to understand how local political parties interests affect EU
implementation.
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